CLASSIFIED UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS REVEALED ON WEST PAPUA
Received from Joyo Indonesia News
Joyo Indonesia News Service
September 15, 2003Classified U.S. Documents Reveal Papua A Victim of Cold War Subterfuge
By Edmund McWilliams [a retired senior Foreign Service
Officer who served as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in
Jakarta in the late 90'sBackground
Classified U.S. Government documents recently obtained through the Freedom of Information Act reveal U.S. complicity in a subterfuge whereby the United Nations General Assembly
gave its formal approval to a manifestly undemocratic plebiscite which denied the people of the Indonesian Province of Papua their right of self-determination. That exercise, known as the
"Act of Free Choice," was promised in an agreement brokered by the U.S.. and signed at the United Nations in 1962 between the outgoing Colonial power, the Dutch, and the Indonesian
Government which claimed the territory.
George Washington University's "National Security Archives's" Brad Simpson compiled the declassified documents collected in research entitled "Funding Repression: The Indonesian - East Timor Project." The compilation of declassified U.S. Government messages and memoranda documents U.S.. Government actions and policies regarding Indonesia's annexation of the territory of West Papua in 1969. The documents reveal a little known, disturbing example of Cold War realpolitik in which a patently undemocratic process enabled the Government of Indonesian dictator Soeharto to assume control of a vast territory populated by a people racially, religiously and culturally distinct from the great majority of the Indonesian population.
Incorporation of the largely Christian/animist, Melanesian Papuans into largely Islamic, Malayu Indonesia has had tragic consequences. Well-respected human rights monitors including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the State Department's own annual human rights report for years have chronicled unrelenting human rights abuse meted out by the Indonesian military
to West Papua's civilian population. These sources and other reporting including UN development assessments also make clear that despite the enormous wealth that has flowed to Jakarta's coffers from West Papua great natural resources, basic health, education and other services remain unavailable to many Papuans after 40 years of Jakarta misrule.
A prominent Papuan human rights activist, John Rumbiak, contends that "the Indonesian government's policies and practices with respect to Papua specifically, the government's
transmigration program, neo-colonial economic exploitation, and militarism have had a devastating impact on the health and welfare of its citizens and on the territory's unique and
important environment.." A Yale research project investigating international genocide, in a report released this Spring, concluded that "throughout the past forty years, the Indonesian
government has shown a callous disregard - and, at times, an intentional and specific malevolence - for the basic human rights and human dignity of the people of West Papua."
The Yale project researchers conclude that the Indonesian government's actions - perpetrated in large part by the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) - against the Papuan people "constituted crimes against humanity and could rise to the level of genocide."
The declassified messages and briefing papers compiled by the National Security Archives project document U.S. (and U.N..) awareness that the Papuans act of self-determination,
the "Act of Free Choice" which the Indonesian Government was required to conduct under a 1962 bilateral agreement with the Government of the Netherlands, was deliberately and fatally flawed in conception and implementation. The U.S., which had brokered negotiations between the departing Dutch colonial power and the Government of President Soekarno, bore a special responsibility to ensure the fairness of the process through which the Papuan people were to determine their future. The documents reveal that the U.S. manifestly failed in this responsibility.
Negotiations for the 1962 "New York Agreement" were organized and mediated by the senior U.S. diplomat Ellsworth Bunker who worked to defuse a festering confrontation between the Dutch and the Government of President Soekarno. Soekarno, father of the current Indonesian President, was determined to unite all of the Dutch colonial holdings in the region under the Indonesian flag and sent troops to West Papua in an attempt to secure it. Ironically, those troops were led by then Colonel Soeharto, the brutal dictator who would subsequently force Soekarno
from power in 1966. In 1962, the Kennedy Administration, anxious to avoid an anti-colonialist war and concerned that the unpredictable nationalist Indonesian leader might turn to Moscow or Beijing for help, employed Bunker to press the Dutch to forego plans to accord the Papuans independence and instead make a deal with the Indonesians. The resulting 1962 "New York Agreement" placed the Papuans under what amounted to an Indonesian trusteeship for seven years, with the promise of an "act of free choice" at the end of that interregnum... The U.N., according to the agreement, was to provide an interim minimum seven month administrative presence allowing the Dutch a diplomatic
departure and, crucially, was also to provide oversight ("assistance and participation") to ensure the act of free choice was free and fair. Papuans were afforded no role in the 1962 negotiations.
The succeeding seven years of rule from Jakarta were a disaster for the Papuans. Under the guise of rooting out ineffectual, small scale resistance mounted by poorly armed Papuans resisting brutal Indonesian rule, the Indonesian military mounted successive campaigns which exacted an enormous toll on the defenseless civilian population. The Indonesians broadly failed to provide critical health services, education or economic development to the Papuans who had languished under Dutch colonial rule. The Indonesian government launched exploitation of the vast natural riches in West Papua well before the "Act of Free Choice" with benefits accruing to the Indonesians and foreign firms, notably the U.S.-based Freeport McMoran
which in 1967 began excavation of what is today the world's
largest copper and gold mine.
What the Documents Reveal
U.S. Government documents reveal clear U.S. understanding that as a consequence of Jakarta's misrule most Papuans, given a free and fair choice, would opt for independence. A
May 1967 U.S. Embassy report noted that the Papuans "resent (the) arrogance of Indonesian military and blame Indonesian officials for drastic shortages of goods and poor living standards now prevailing." A separate Embassy report explained that the Indonesian Government's presence in West Papua "is expressed primarily in the form of the Army." An October 1967 Embassy airgram cited a Papuan holding a senior position in the Indonesian Foreign ministry as stating "99 percent of the Papuan population favors independence from Indonesia." A July 1969 "confidential" airgram from the Embassy reported that "grievances and anti-GOI sentiment are quite real, however, and there is little question that a great majority of the non-Stone Age Irianese favor a termination of Indonesian rule." The message continued: "Opposition to the GOI stems from economic deprivation over the years, military repression and capriciousness and mal-administration." The report concluded that "probably a decided majority of the Irianese people, and possibly 85 to 90 percent, are in sympathy with the Free Papua cause or at least intensely dislikes Indonesians." The message identified among the Indonesian rulers "a tendency to degrade the Irianese for their darker skin" and noted that Indonesian soldiers "commonly expropriate agricultural commodities." The report also cites a more specific crime noting multiple reports from missionaries that upon taking control of West Papua from the UN in 1963, Indonesian military personnel emptied warehouses of goods belonging to local merchants and transported the merchandise and food by Indonesian Air Force planes out of the area. The report notes that within two months, there was an acute shortage of food and consumer goods. Reporting from the Embassy to Washington is also replete with accounts of human rights abuse by the Indonesian authorities including holding and mistreatment of political prisoners, looting conducted against the Papuan civil population, and general brutality.
At the same time, the Embassy also was aware of the Indonesian Government's determination to retain control of West Papua ("West Irian"). A February 1968 Embassy airgram cited "most observers" as concluding that while there was broad Papuan support for independence, "Indonesia will not permit a plebiscite which would reach such an outcome." While the U.S. Embassy met regularly with Papuans and reported their grievances in classified channels to Washington, senior U.S. officials made clear to the Papuans that they "should look to Holland in the first instance for insuring the fair implementation of the New York Agreement" arguing that while the U.S. brokered the agreement, it was not a signatory to it. At the same time, Embassy reporting also noted Indonesian efforts to prevent Papuans from contacting and seeking redress from the few U.N. officials in the area.
The visit of an Embassy official to Papua in early 1968 provided the U.S. with early warning that the Indonesians were planning to subvert the "Act of Free Choice," the plebiscite that was to have been a genuine act of self-determination as envisaged in the U.S.-brokered 1962 New York agreement. An extensive report on the visit cited a U.N. official as describing the "probable" Indonesian plans as entailing the following: "the Government will divide West Irian into a number of areas and select a slate of three to five persons from each area; a minority of each area's groups may be chosen on the basis of local preference, but the majority will be Indonesian or Indonesian controlled; the groups thus constituted will convene as a whole and endorse union with Indonesia." That description largely anticipated the subterfuge Jakarta was to conduct some 18 months later. Underscoring the necessity of resorting to such fraud, the same report notes "all but one Westerner contacted were persistent in the belief that Indonesia could not win an open election." The Embassy reporting officer concluded that "violence is inevitable."
The documents make clear that while the U.S. Government, through its Embassy in Jakarta, was fully aware of the Indonesian intent to subvert the plebiscite, Washington was not disposed to do anything to protect the democratic integrity of the process. A June 1969 Embassy "confidential" telegram to the State Department stated: "Considering all aspects of (the) situation, mission wholeheartedly endorses Department position and guidance ... USG has nothing to gain by interfering in (an) already complex problem and thereby disrupting present fruitful relations with GOI (Government of Indonesia)." The Embassy message to the Department continues, "we should, however, continue in low key to bring to GOI attention need for credibility in Act of Free Choice for Irianese sake and to keep relations with Government of Australia and Government of Netherlands on (an) even keel." A "secret" State Department telegram to the U.S. delegation
at the United Nations also in June 1969 underscored this U.S. position. It instructed the U.S. UN team as follows: "As you are aware, discussion (of) this subject with U Thant (UN Secretary General) is for a number of reasons a very delicate matter. We do not wish to undercut our noninvolved stance and appear to be interfering in what is essentially a matter between SYG (Secretary General U Thant) and GOI. We wish especially to avoid leaving (the) impression that USG (is) pressing the SYG toward firmer position with GOI on carrying out 'letter and spirit' of the 1962 agreement."
The importance of maintaining a discreet public distance from the rigged plebiscite was underscored in a "secret" memo signed by Henry Kissinger, then serving as Director
of the National Security Council, and addressed to President Nixon. The July 18, 1969 document is a briefing paper preparing President Nixon for his upcoming visit to Jakarta.
Kissinger's briefing paper, under the heading of "Points to Avoid," cautions Nixon: "the West Irian "act of free choice" will be underway during your visit. It consists of a series of consultations rather than a direct election, which would be almost meaningless among the stone age cultures of New Guinea." Kissinger's memo continues: "there is a UN observer on the scene, and we assume that U Thant will go along with the Indonesian form of the act of free choice. There is, however, a small but active West Papuan independence movement, and a variety of groups
in Australia and the Netherlands which take exception to the Indonesian techniques of self-determination. Because the U.S. played a mediating role in resolving the Indonesian/Dutch
controversy over the future of West Irian, there may be a tendency to associate you with the form in which the act of free choice is being conducted. We should avoid any U.S. identification with this act."In "talking points" prepared for Nixon's meeting with Soeharto, the Kissinger memo advises Nixon that "we believe West Irian will definitely decide to stay with Indonesia." Kissinger
advises Nixon not to raise the issue but adds that if the Indonesians were to raise it, Nixon should say that "we understand the problems they face in West Irian but do not believe it is in our interest or that of Indonesia for us to become directly involved." The U.S. willingness to give tacit support to the subterfuge in West Papua, which was underway during the visit, is explained in part by the Kissinger memo's description of the Soeharto regime, whose army, by that time, had succeeded in killing hundreds of thousands, possibly half a million political enemies. Kissinger's memo said of Soeharto's rule: "The government is under the control of a moderate military man, Suharto, who although indecisive by outside standards is committed to progress and reform.
He has achieved impressive results in his own way in cleaning up the mess left by Sukarno."
As planning for the a mid-1969 "Act of Free Choice" unfolded, the Embassy reported without comment information provide by the Indonesian Government that it had succeeded in
limiting the role of the Secretary General's personal representative, Bolivian Ambassador Fernando Ortiz-Sans, who, according to the New York Agreement, was to assist in administering
the plebiscite. The Embassy reported that the Indonesians in New York had managed to delay the arrival of the UN official (Bolivian Ambassador Ortiz Sans), reduce his staff from 11
to five (his staff eventually grew to 16) and ensure that he would be based in Jakarta and not in West Irian. A May 1969 airgram from the Embassy noted the diminished role of Ortiz-Sans as the plebiscite approached: "the active role he envisaged for (his) mission in influencing the GOI has been blunted in recent months and his grand plans have been circumscribed and his activities limited strictly to observer/advisory function."
The Embassy also regularly reported progress of GOI plans to preclude any democratic result in the plebiscite. An August 1968 telegram from the Ambassador described the Indonesian Government as "working to carry out (the) 1962 agreement in (a) manner which is meaningful but which at the same time will ensure continued Indonesian control of West Irian." A June 1969 Embassy airgram reported without comment death threats from the Indonesian military issued to any Papuan who did not vote for integration in the "Act of Free Choice."
The "Act of Free Choice" transpired during the summer of 1969 and followed Jakarta's plan closely. The Indonesians selected a total of 1026 Papuans who were assembled at various locations and given the option to vote for or against Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. (Eventually only 1,022 participated.) The process, as described in notes from the period compiled by a western journalist in Papua and by an Indonesian "observer" sponsored by Jakarta, was transparently fraudulent. "Delegates" were encouraged to drink excessively by their Jakarta military hosts. Those who indicated any resistance to a pro-Jakarta vote were bluntly threatened. In the end, the vote was unanimous for annexation.
U.S. behind-the-scenes support for Jakarta's fraudulent "Act of Free Choice" was most important at the United Nations where the General Assembly, in the Fall of 1969, was called to accept the exercise. An August 1969 memo from the State Department's Director for Indonesia, Paul Gardner, to Assistant Secretary Green in advance of a meeting between Ambassador Green and the Indonesian U.N. Ambassador reconfirmed the USG strategy of offering quiet diplomatic support to the Indonesians. The memo alerted Green that "the Ambassador might ask for our
support in preparing smooth U.N. handling of the act." It advised: "You might point out that lobbying for certain procedures could focus undue attention on the agenda item, stimulating other nations to take part. If asked by other delegations for our views, however, the U.S. delegation would note that lengthy debate could serve no useful purpose." In fact, U.S. support for the Indonesians at the U.N. General Assembly ultimately proved to be substantial. A November 17, 1969 "memorandum of conversation" reported on a discussion between Secretary of State Rogers and Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik and their staffs. The memo notes that in response to a request from Malik that the U.S. "do what it could to convince the African nations of the need for judicious handling of the "Act of Free Choice matter," Secretary Rogers responded that the U.S. "had already been in touch with the delegations mentioned by Foreign Minister
Malik as well as with others." Rogers added: "In our general discussions on this matter we have taken the position that the 1962 Agreement has been satisfactorily executed." The Secretary then offered to contact one key African Ambassador personally.
The importance of the U.S. role in the ultimate UN failure to disapprove the fraudulent "act of free choice" is made clearin a December 1969 message from the Indonesian mission to the UN to the U.S. mission. The message, signed by the Indonesian Mission Chief, states: "On behalf of the
Indonesian delegation, permanent mission and staff, let me express to you our appreciation for your valuable support regarding West Irian, which has helped make possible the
successful completion of the long struggle of the Indonesian people for complete freedom, national unity and territorial integrity."
Postscript: In what must appear as deja vu for Papuans, the U.S. and the international community appear again to be conspiring with the Government of Indonesia to subvert
the civil and political rights of the Papuans. After having pressed Papuans to accept Jakarta's offers of "special autonomy" rather than pursue independence, the U.S. and manyin the
international community have reacted in silence as Jakarta has reneged on its own special autonomy offer and instead, has sought to divide the Province into three parts. At the same time, among those concerned about justice for the Papuans, there is a growing campaign to persuade the United Nations to review its acceptance of the fraudulent 1969 "Act of Free Choice."
Contact Information
e-mail: wpngnc@optusnet.com.au