Dag Hammarskjöld's Murder


DAG HAMMARSKJOLD (SWEDEN)

Second United Nations Secretary-General


Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjold was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 10 April 1953 until 18 September 1961 when he met his death in a plane accident while on a peace mission in the Congo. He was born on 29 July 1905 in Jonkoping in south-central Sweden. The fourth son of Hjalmar Hammarskjold, Prime Minister of Sweden during the years of World War I, and his wife Agnes, M.C. (b. Almquist), he was brought up in the university town of Uppsala where his father resided as Governor of the county of Uppland.
At 18, he was graduated from college and enrolled in Uppsala University. Majoring in French history of literature, social philosophy and political economy, Mr. Hammarskjold received, with honors, his Bachelor of Arts degree two years later. The next three years he studied economics, at the same university, where he received a "filosofic licenciat" degree in economics at the age of 23. He continued his studies for two more years to become a Bachelor of Laws in 1930.

Mr. Hammarskjold then moved to Stockholm, where he became a secretary of a governmental committee on unemployment (1930-1934). At the same time he wrote his doctor's thesis in economics, entitled, "Konjunkturspridningen" (The Spread of the Business Cycle). In 1933 he received his doctor's degree from the University of Stockholm, where he was made assistant professor in political economy.

At the age of 31 and after having served one year as secretary in the National Bank of Sweden, Mr. Hammarskjold was appointed to the post of Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. He concurrently served as Chairman of the National Bank's Board, from 1941 to 1948. Six of the Board's members are appointed by Parliament and the Chairman by the Government. This was the first time that one man had held both posts, the Chairmanship of the Bank's Board and that of Under-Secretary of the Finance Ministry.

Early in 1945, he was appointed an adviser to the Cabinet on financial and economic problems, organizing and coordinating, among other things, different governmental planning for the various economic problems that arose as a result of the war and the postwar period. During these years, Mr. Hammarskjold played an important part in shaping Sweden's financial policy. He led a series of trade and financial negotiations with other countries, among them the United States and the United Kingdom.

In 1947 he was appointed to the Foreign Office, where he was responsible for all economic questions with rank of Under-Secretary. In 1949, he was appointed Secretary-General of the Foreign Office and in 1951, he joined the Cabinet as Minister without portfolio. He became, in effect, Deputy Foreign Minister, dealing especially with economic problems and various plans for close economic cooperation.

He was a delegate to the Paris Conference in 1947, when the Marshall Plan machinery was established. He was his country's chief delegate to the 1948 Paris Conference of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). For some years he served as Vice-Chairman of the OEEC Executive Committee. In 1950, he became Chairman of the Swedish Delegation to UNISCAN, established to promote economic cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. He was also a member (1937-1948) of the advisory board of the government-sponsored Economic Research Institute.

He was Vice-Chairman of the Swedish Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris 1951-1952, and acting Chairman of his country's delegation to the Seventh General Assembly in New York in 1952-1953.

Although he served with the Social-Democratic cabinet, Mr. Hammarskjold never Joined any political party, regarding himself as an independent, politically.

On 20 December 1954, he became a member of the Swedish Academy. He was elected to take the seat in the Academy previously held by his father.


Elected to two terms as Secretary-General
Mr. Hammarskjold was unanimously appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations by the General Assembly on 7 April 1953 on the recommendation of the Security Council. He was reelected unanimously for another term of five years in September 1957.
During his terms as Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold carried out many responsibilities for the United Nations in the course of its efforts to prevent war and serve the other aims of the Charter.

In the Middle East these included: continuing diplomatic activity in support of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States and to promote progress toward better and more peaceful conditions in the area; organization in 1956 of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and its administration since then; clearance of the Suez Canal in 1957 and assistance in the peaceful solution of the Suez Canal dispute; organization and administration of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and establishment of an office of the special representative of the Secretary-General in Jordan in 1958.

In 1955, following his visit to Peking, 30 December 1954 - 13 January 1955, 15 detained American fliers who had served under the United Nations Command in Korea were released by the Chinese People's Republic. Mr. Hammarskjold also traveled to many countries of Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas and the Middle East, either on specific assignments or to further his acquaintance with officials of member governments and the problems of various areas.

On one of these trips, from 18 December 1959 to 31 January 1960, the Secretary-General visited 21 countries and territories in Africa -- a trip he described later as "a strictly professional trip for study, for information", in which he said he had gained a "kind of cross-section of every sort of politically responsible opinion in the Africa of today".

Later in 1960, when President Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Republic of the Congo sent a cable on 12 July asking "urgent dispatch" of United Nations military assistance to the Congo, the Secretary-General addressed the Security Council at a night meeting on 13 July and asked the Council to act "with utmost speed" on the request. Following Security Council actions the United Nations Force in the Congo was established and the Secretary-General himself made four trips to the Congo in connection with the United Nations operations there. The first two trips to the Congo were made in July and August 1960. Then, in January of that year, the Secretary-General stopped in the Congo while en route to the Union of South Africa on another mission in connection with the racial problems of that country. The fourth trip to the Congo began on 12 September and terminated with the fatal plane accident.

In other fields of work, Mr. Hammarskjold was responsible for the organization in 1955 and 1958 of the first and second UN international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Geneva, and for planning a UN conference on the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less developed areas of the world held in 1962.

He held honorary degrees from Oxford University, England; in the United States from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Pennsylvania, Amherst, John Hopkins, the University of California, Uppsala College, and Ohio University; and in Canada from Carleton College and from McGill University.

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The above is a biography on Dag Hammarskjold only he didn't die in a accidental plane crash - he was murdered.  Information has now come to light that Mr Hammarskjold  was murdered as a result of CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency) and MI5 (British Secret Service) involvement in the placement of a bomb on Mr Hammarskjold's aircraft on 18 September, 1961 in Northern Rhodesia, as it was then known.

The WPNGNC was made aware of this fact about three years ago when one of our representatives spoke to South African, Bishop Desmond Tutu.  The evidence came to light during the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings.

SEE THIS LINK - How the CIA sent Nelson Mandela to prison for 28 years by William Blum.

See the article below:-


by MARLENE BURGER
Capetown: Documents the Truth Commission stumbled across linking South African agents to the airline death of UN chief Dag Hammarskjöld, also reveal that the project was hatched at the highest levels of the CIA and MI5.

The alleged plot to assassinate United Nations secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld 37 years ago was the brainchild of at least two British security agencies — MI5 and the Special Operations Executive — and the CIA, top-secret documents show.

For once, apartheid's dirty tricks brigade appears to have been falsely accused of involvement in the murder.

A series of messages between a commodore and a captain, whose names have been expunged by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, point to a plot hatched on South African soil by a group which had access to vast amounts of money and the ability to muster mercenary forces to protect international investment in turbulent post-colonial Africa.

The messages, all on letterheads of the South Africa Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR), cover the period from July 1960 to September 17 1961 — the day on which Hammarskjöld's aircraft crashed while approaching the airport at Ndola in the then Northern Rhodesia.

In addition to outlining Operation Celeste — the plan to get rid of the "troublesome" Hammarskjöld — the documents implicate the SAIMR and international intelligence agencies in the death of Patrice Lumumba, the pro-communist first president of the Congo. Lumumba was deposed in September 1960 and allegedly shot while escaping from custody in the breakaway province of Katanga in 1961.

The documents, found by a truth commission researcher investigating an apparently unrelated matter, implicate then CIA chief Allen Dulles in Operation Celeste. They also claim that the explosives used for the bomb that downed the aircraft were supplied by a Belgian mining conglomerate, Union Miniere. The company had extensive interests in copper-rich Katanga, and is known to have backed to Tshombe's use of mercenaries, including the group led by South Africa's Colonel "Mad Mike" Hoare.

The most damning report refers to a meeting between MI5, Special Operations Executive, the CIA and the SAIMR at which it was recorded that Dulles "agrees ... Dag is becoming troublesome and ... should be removed". According to the documents, Dulles "has promised full co-operation from his people ... Dag will be in Leopoldville on or about 12/9/61. The aircraft ferrying him will be a DC6 in the livery of [Swedish company] Transair."

The captain is ordered to "see that Leo airport [Leopoldville, now Kinshasa] as well as Elizabethville [now Lubumbashi] is covered by your people, as I want his removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice [Lumumba]".

The first message is dated July 12 1960, less than two weeks after the Congo became independent: “Head office is rather concerned with developments in the Congo, particularly the Haute Katanga, where it appears the local strongman Moise Tshombe, supported by Union Miniere, is planning a secession." The writer claims to "have it on good authority that the UNO [United Nations Organisation] will want to get its greedy paws on the province”. He says he has been instructed to ask the captain "to send as many agents as you think would be needed to bolster Congo Red's unit in case of future problems".

Civil war broke out in the Congo four days after independence, and Tshombe announced Katanga's secession on July 11. The commodore records this in his next message, sent on July 15, the day UN troops arrived at Lumumba's request.

The next orders inform the captain: "Your contact with CIA is Dwight. He will be residing at Hotel Leopold II in Elizabethville from now until November 1 1961. The password is: ‘How is Celeste these days?' His response should be: 'She's recovering nicely apart from the cough.'"
Hammarskjöld's death appears to have been part of an attempt to prevent Katanga's mineral wealth from falling under communist control.

On September 14 1961, a message couriered to the SAIMR's offices in De Villiers Street, Johannesburg, recorded: "DC6 aircraft bearing Transair livery is parked at Leo to be used for transport of subject. Our technician has orders to plant 6lb TNT in the wheelbay with contact detonator to activate as wheels are retracted on taking off."

An earlier message records that "Union Miniere has offered to provide logistic or other support. We have told them to have 6lb of TNT at all possible locations with detonators, electrical contacts and wiring, batteries, etc."

A report dated September 17 records: "Device failed on take-off, and the aircraft crashed a few hours later as it prepared to land." An official inquiry blamed pilot error.

The documents have been dismissed as fakes by a former Swedish diplomat, and both MI5 and the CIA have denied any involvement in Hammarskjöld's death. However, they bear a striking resemblance to other documents emanating from the SAIMR seven years ago, when it was headed by self-styled commodore Keith Maxwell-Annandale and forged links with both South Africa's military intelligence and the National Intelligence Services. These documents show the SAIMR masterminded the abortive 1981 attempt to depose Seychelles president Albert René. It was also behind a successful 1990 coup in Somalia.

Source : Electronic Mail&Guardian, August 28, 1998. http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/

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As can be seen by reading his biography Dag Hammarskjold  was a hands on Secretary General of the United Nations and was not a puppet of either Britain, the US or Russia.  The era was at the height of the Cold War between the US, Britain and Russia.  McCarthyism was in full swing and Communism was to defeated at ALL cost.  The Cuban Missile crisis between the US and Russia was only twelve months away (October, 1962).  President J F Kennedy was inaugurated on 20 January, 1961 having succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The American CIA which had enormous power (including covert) was supposedly answerable to the US National Security Council and who was President Nixon's National Security Advisor in 1969 (West Papuan Act of Free Choice (No Choice)? - none other than Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger's involvement with the CIA goes back quite a few years earlier. Kissinger was an army intelligence officer during WWII.  Kissinger spoke fluent German and personally interrogated many of the high ranking NAZI prisoners post war. There is no reason to believe that Kissinger severed his intelligence role links after the creation of the CIA  in 1947.

Dr. Kissinger was born in Fuerth, Germany, on May 27, 1923, came to the United States in 1938, and was naturalised a United States citizen on June 19, 1943. He received the BA Degree Summa Cum Laude at Harvard College in 1950 and the MA and PhD Degrees at Harvard University in 1952 and 1954 respectively

From 1943 to 1946 Dr. Kissinger served in the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps and from 1946 to 1949 was a captain in the Military Intelligence Reserve.

Kissinger enrolled  at Harvard and received a B.A. Degree from Harvard College in 1950 and M.A. and Ph.D. Degrees from Harvard University in 1952 and 1954, respectively. From 1954 until 1969 he was a member of the Faculty of Harvard University, both in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs. He served as Study Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, for the Council of Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956; Director of the Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 1956 to 1958; Director of the Harvard International Seminar from 1952 to 1969; and Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program from 1958 to 1969.

Harvard University: Professor (1954-1971)
Harvard University Center for International Affairs: Associate Director (1957-1960)
Council on Foreign Relations: Study Director for Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1955-1956)
Harvard International Seminar: Director (1951-1971)

He has served as a consultant to the Department of State (1965-68),

 

The CIA was known to be very active at several US universities. The CIA has created a special scholarship program, for graduate students able and willing to obtain security clearances. According to the London Guardian, "the primary purpose of the program is to promote disciplines that would be of use to intelligence agencies."4 And throughout the country, academics in several disciplines are undertaking research (often secret) for the CIA.

To be sure, such consultation has a long history, extending back to the beginning of the Cold War. During the 1950s, the CIA and military intelligence were among the main sources of funding for the social sciences, having supported such institutions as the Columbia's Russian Research Institute, Harvard's Russian Research Center, and MIT's Center for International Studies. Outside the campus setting, major research foundations, including the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation, were closely integrated with the Agency. The field of political communications was transformed during the early Cold War by large-scale U.S. government funding, in which leading academics helped intelligence agencies to develop modern techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare.

Research on Third World development and counterinsurgency techniques were other fruitful areas of investigation.5 The field of political science appears to have been at the forefront of such CIA collaboration, and some of the resulting activities strained the limits of academic propriety. Noam Chomsky provides the following recollection of his experiences at MIT:

Around 1960, the Political Science Department separated off from the Economics Department. And at that time it was openly funded by the CIA; it was not even a secret... In the mid-1960s, it stopped being publicly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, but it was still directly involved in activities that were scandalous. The Political Science Department was so far as I know the only department on campus which had closed, secret seminars. I was once invited to talk to one, which is how I learned about it. They had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for their doctoral dissertations.6

In a carrot and stick strategy, these activities were combined with rigorous scrutiny of dissident professors and, in the words of historian Bruce Cumings: "It is only a bit of an exaggeration to say that for those scholars studying enemy countries, either they consulted with the government or they risked being investigated by the FBI."7 The CIA also developed remarkably close ties to the field of journalism and, during the period 1947-77, some 400 American journalists "secretly carried out assignments" for the Agency, according to a classic investigative study by Carl Bernstein. Some 200 of these journalists signed secrecy agreements or employment contracts with the CIA. "By far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the New York Times, CBS, and Time Inc."8 Overseas, U.S. intelligence officers funded academics and writers through a series of front organizations and publications, coordinated by the CIA-controlled Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Refer to our page on Henry Kissinger and Freeport Mine.

Below is a brief history of the CIA:-

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

HISTORY

In response to this policy debate, President Harry S. Truman established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946, directing it to coordinate existing departmental intelligence, supplementing but not supplanting their services. This was all to be done under the direction of a National Intelligence Authority composed of a Presidential representative and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who was the Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, was appointed the first Director of Central Intelligence. Twenty months later, the National Intelligence Authority and its operating component, the Central Intelligence Group, were disestablished.

Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on 18 September 1947) the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were established. Most of the National Security Act's specific assignments given the CIA~ as well as the prohibitions on police and internal security functions, closely follow both the original 1944 Donovan plan and the Presidential directive creating the Central Intelligence Group. The 1947 Act charged the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence which affects national security. In addition, the Agency was to perform such other duties and functions related to intelligence as the NSC might direct. The Act also made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods.

In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act was passed supplementing the 1947 Act by permitting the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures and exempting CIA from many of the usual limitations on the expenditure of federal funds. It provided that CIA funds could be included in the budgets of other departments and then transferred to the Agency without regard to the restrictions placed on the initial appropriation. This Act is the statutory authority for the secrecy of the Agency's budget. In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure, the 1949 Act further exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, names? Officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed."

The office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) evolved gradually. Until 1953, Deputy Directors were appointed by the Director, and it was General Walter Bedell Smith, the fourth DCI, who established the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the role he has since played in CIA. Congress recognized the importance of the position in April 1953 by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the appointment of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This amendment also provided that commissioned officers of the armed forces, whether active or retired, could not occupy both DCI and DDCI positions at the same time. The DDCI assists the Director by performing such functions as the DCI assigns or delegates. He acts for and exercises the powers of the Director during his absence or disability, or in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Director.

Under these Statutes, the Director serves as the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to national security. CIA's responsibilities are carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and the NSC.

Today the CIA reports regularly to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as required by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and various Executive Orders. The Agency also reports regularly to the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees in both houses of Congress. Moreover, the Agency provides substantive briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Services Committees in both bodies as well as other Committees and individual members.


CIA Organizational Development


[Adapted from: United States Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence -- Book I, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 April 1976, pages 102-118.]
The Central Intelligence Group was authorized in spring of 1946 to establish an Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). ORE's functions were manifold -- the production of national current intelligence, scientific, technical, and economic intelligence as well as interagency coordination for national estimates. With its own research and analysis capability, the CIG could carry out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the other departments for data. The change made the CIG an intelligence producer, while still assuming the continuation of its role as a coordinator for estimates. Yet acquisition of a research and analysis role meant that independent production would outstrip coordinated intelligence as a primary mission. Fundamentally, it would be far easier to assimilate and analyze data than it had been or would be to engage the Departments in producing "coordinated" analysis. The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an independent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a clandestine collection capability.

The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force, provided for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a Secretary of Defense, and created the National Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent department and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. The four general tasks assigned to the Agency were to advise the NSC on matters related to national security; to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the Departments; to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination and "to perform such other functions ... as the NSC will from time to time direct...."

The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection, overt collection, production of national current intelligence and interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the personnel and internal structure remained the same. The Act affirmed the CIA's role in coordinating the intelligence activities of the State Department and the military-determining which activities would most appropriately and most efficiently be conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication.

In 1947 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements 2 among the Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the Committee included representatives from the Departments of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Stag, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the DCI was to establish priorities for intelligence collection and analysis, he did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control the departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing to compromise what it perceived as-its own intelligence needs to meet the collective needs of policy makers as defined by the DCI.

As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its estimates function but continued to expand its independent intelligence production. In July 1949 an internal study conducted by a senior ORE staff member stated that ORE's emphasis in production had shifted "from the broad long-term type of problem to a narrowly defined short-term type and from the predictive to the non-predictive type." In 1949 ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of these addressed national intelligence questions and was published with the concurrence or dissent of the other departments. Less than one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purpose for which the CIG and the CIA had been created.

By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, it was c]car that the CIA's record on the production of national intelligence estimates had fallen far short of expectation. ORE had become a directionless service organization, attempting to answer requirements levied by all agencies related to all manner of subjects -- politics, economics, science, and technology. The wholesale growth had only confused ORE's mission and ]ed the organization into attempting analysis in areas already adequately covered by other departments.

Smith embarked on a program of reorganization. His most significant change was the creation of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), whose sole purpose was to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). There were two components in ONE, a staff which drafted the estimates and a senior body, known as the Board of National Estimates, which reviewed the estimates, coordinated the judgments with other agencies, and negotiated over their final form.

Smith also attempted to redefine the DCI's position in relation to the departmental intelligence components. From 1947 to 1950 the DCIs had functioned at the mercy of the Departments rather than exercising direction over them. By formally stating his position as the senior member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith tried to assume a degree of administrative control over departmental activities. Nonetheless, the obstacles remained, and personal influence, rather than recognized authority, determined the effectiveness of Smith and his successors in interdepartmental relationships.

In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), ORE was dissolved and its personnel were reassigned. In addition to ONE, the DDI's intelligence production components included: the Office of Research and Reports (ORE), which handled economic and geographic intelligence; the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which engaged in basic scientific research; and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which provided current political research. Collection of overt information was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (NO). The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the dissemination of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence.

The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence production. Government-wide demands for the Agency to provide information on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world justified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered 3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. DDI's major effort was independent intelligence production rather than coordinated national estimates.

The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major effort by a DCI to insure consistent contact and coordination with the community. Yet, from the outset DCI McCone accepted the limitations on his authority; although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed to provide him with access to the Defense Department budget (which still constitutes 80 percent of the intelligence community's overall budget), McCone could not direct or control the intelligence components of the other departments. The NIPE staff directed most of its attention to sorting out intelligence requirements through USIB and attempting to develop a national inventory for the community, including budget, personnel and materials. Remarkably, this had never before been done.

The most pressing problem for the community was the adjustment to the impact of technical collection capabilities. The large budgetary resources involved, and the value of the data generated by overhead reconnaissance systems precipitated a major bureaucratic battle over their administration and control. From 1963 to 1965, much of McCone's and the senior NIPE staff officer's community efforts were directed toward working out an agreement with the Air Force on development, production, and deployment of overhead reconnaissance systems.

Internally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of technical and scientific advances. In 1963, the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was created. Previously, scientific and technical intelligence production had been scattered among the other three directorates. The process of organizing an independent directorate meant wresting personnel and resources from the existing components. Predictably, the resistance was considerable, and a year and a half passed between the first attempts at creating the Directorate and its actual establishment.

The new component included the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the office of ELINT (electronic intercepts) from DDI, the Data Processing Staff from DDA, the Development Projects Division (responsible for overhead reconnaissance) from the DDP, and a newly created Office of Research and Development. Later, the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center was added.

The Directorate's specific functions included, and continue to include, research, development, operation, data collection, analysis, and contributions to National Intelligence Estimates. The Directorate was organized on the premise that close cooperation should exist between research and application on the one hand, and technical collection and analysis all the other. This close coordination along with the staffing anti career patterns in the Directorate have contributed to the continuing vitality and quality of the DDS&T's work.

The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component; the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However, the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number of arrangements insured constant interchanges between the Directorate and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all research and development for technical systems was done through contracting, the DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the most advanced technical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality professionals from the industrial and scientific communities, the Directorate established a competitive salary scale. The result has been personnel mobility between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been unusual for individuals to leave private industry, assume positions with DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This pattern has provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the practice of regularly employing advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T staff participation in conferences and seminars sponsored by professional associations.

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Sources
[Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook on Intelligence, December 1992, pages 4-5.]

 


See CIA involvement in drug trade.

 

Agee,P. On the Run. 1987
Agee, Philip. On the Run. Secaucus NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1987. 400 pages.
In 1968 Philip Agee was finally disgusted with his dirty work as a CIA officer in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico. He submitted a letter of resignation and immediately slipped into Cuba, then went to France and Britain. As he wrote his memoirs while scraping by on handouts, he frequently wondered if some of the people who were helping him could be trusted. The answer was "no" -- a typewriter that one friend loaned him was discovered to contain a homing transmitter. Finally his book "Inside the Company" was published in 1975, launching his career as history's most celebrated anti-CIA activist. The CIA kept harassing Agee, even though he retains his U.S. citizenship and has never been charged with a crime. He was expelled from Britain, France, and Holland, and his U.S. passport was revoked in 1979. Today he lives in Germany, is still trying to get his passport back, and does speaking tours on U.S. college campuses.
While "Inside the Company" chronicles Agee's activities as a CIA officer, "On the Run" is part two of his autobiography. It covers the years between his resignation and the publication of his memoirs, and the succession of legal problems in a number of European countries once he became a celebrity. Besides reading almost like a thriller, this book is also valuable as a history of the anti-CIA movement.
ISBN 0-8184-0419-1

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The WPNGNC believes that if DAG HAMMARSKJOLD was left to complete his job, of achieving world peace, without interference from the CIA or MI5 then Indonesia would be a much different country today.

Countries like East Timor, Acheh, Mollocus Islands and West Papua would not have been held captive by Indonesia and that millions of people would have survived and be alive today.


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