"INDONESIAN OCCUPATION HISTORY"

Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice"

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Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice"

Document Release Marks 35th Anniversary of Controversial Vote and Annexation Secret Files Show U.S. Support for Indonesia, Human Rights Abuses by Indonesian Military

Washington, D.C. - July 8, 2004 - "You should tell [Suharto] that we understand the problems they face in West Irian," national security adviser Henry Kissinger wrote President Nixon on the eve of Nixon's July 1969 visit to Indonesia. On the 35th anniversary of West Papua's so-called "Act of Free Choice" and Indonesia's first direct presidential elections, the
National Security Archive posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations leading to Indonesia's controversial 1969 annexation of the territory. The documents detail United States support for Indonesia's heavy-handed takeover of West Papua despite overwhelming Papuan opposition and United Nation's requirements for genuine self-determination.

Background

When Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the Dutch government retained control over the territory of West New Guinea. From 1949 until 1961 the Indonesian government sought to "recover" West New Guinea (later known as West Irian or West Papua), arguing that the territory, a part of the former Netherlands East Indies, rightfully belonged with Indonesia.

In late 1961, after repeated and unsuccessful attempts to secure its goals through the United Nations, Indonesia's President Sukarno declared a military mobilization and threatened to invade West New Guinea and annex it by force. The Kennedy administration, fearing that U.S. opposition to Indonesian demands might push the country toward Communism, sponsored talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the spring of 1962. Negotiations took place under the shadow of ongoing Indonesian military incursions into West New Guinea and the threat of an Indonesian invasion.

The U.S.-sponsored talks led to the August 1962 New York Agreements, which awarded Indonesia control of West New Guinea (which it promptly renamed West Irian) after a brief transitional period overseen by the UN. (Note 1) The agreement obligated Jakarta to conduct an election on self-determination with UN assistance no later than 1969. Once in control, however, Indonesia quickly moved to repress political dissent by groups demanding outright independence for the territory.

U.S. officials understood at the outset that Indonesia would never allow West Irian to become independent and that it was unlikely to ever allow a meaningful act of self-determination to take place. The Johnson and Nixon Administrations were equally reluctant to challenge Indonesian control over West Irian, especially after the conservative anti-Communist regime of General Suharto
took over in 1966 following an abortive coup attempt which led to the slaughter of an estimated 500,000 alleged Communists. Suharto quickly moved to liberalize the Indonesian economy and open it to the West, passing a new foreign investment law in late 1967. The first company to take advantage of the law was
the American mining company Freeport Sulphur, which gained concessions to vast tracts of land in West Irian containing gold and copper reserves. (Note 2)

Over six weeks from July to August 1969, U.N. officials conducted the so-called "Act of Free Choice." Under the articles of the New York Agreement (Article 18) all adult Papuans had the right to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice. Instead, Indonesian authorities selected 1022 West Papuans to vote publicly and
unanimously in favor of integration with Indonesia.

Despite significant evidence that Indonesia had failed to meet its international obligations, in November 1969 the United Nations "took note" of the "Act of Free Choice" and its results, thereby lending support of the world body to Indonesia's annexation.

Thirty-five years later, as Indonesia holds its first-ever direct Presidential elections, the international community has come to question the validity of Jakarta's takeover of West Papua and ongoing human rights abuses there. In March, 88 members of the Irish Parliament urged Kofi Annan to review the United Nations' role in the 1969 Act of Free Choice, joining South African Archibishop
Desmond Tutu and scores of non-governmental organizations and European Parliamentarians. On June 28, 2004, nineteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan urging the appointment of a Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor the human rights situation in West Papua and the territory of Aceh.

The Documents

The Archives postings include a confidential February 1968 cable from U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green. Following a conversation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik about the situation in West Irian, Green concluded that conditions in the territory are "far from satisfactory and deteriorating." A subsequent cable reported that Indonesia is "belatedly and
almost desperately seeking to develop support among the peoples of West Irian" for the "Act of Free Choice."

A consular trip to West Irian in early 1968 observed that "the Indonesian government directs its main efforts" in the territory to "maintaining existing political facilities and suppressing political dissent." Because of neglect, corruption and repression at the hands of Indonesian authorities, Western observers agreed almost unanimously that "Indonesia could not win an open election" and that the vast majority of West Irian's inhabitants favored independence.

In July of 1968 the UN-appointed Ambassador Fernando Ortiz Sanz arrived in Jakarta as the Secretary General's Special Representative for assisting Indonesia with the West Irian plebiscite, as called for by the 1962 New York Agreements.

A confidential cable from the US Embassy to the State Department outlined the stakes in the upcoming "Act of Free Choice." While cautioning that the U.S.government "should not become directly involved in this issue," Ambassador Green worried that Ortiz Sanz or other UN members might "hold out for free and direct elections" in West Irian, frustrating Indonesia's intention to retain the territory at all costs. Consequently, U.S. and other Western officials worried about the need to meet with Ortiz Sanz to "make him aware of political realities." In a confidential October 1968 Airgram the U.S. Embassy reported with relief that Ortiz now "concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interest of the U.N., as well as the GOI, that a result
other than the continuance of West Irian within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge."

The Indonesian government firmly rejected the possibility of a one-person, one-vote plebiscite in West Irian, insisting instead on a series of local 'consultations' with just over 1,000 hand selected tribal leaders (out of an estimated population of 800,000), conducted in July 1969 with between 6,000-10,000 Indonesian troops spread throughout the territory. As the U.S. Embassy put it in a July 1969 telegram:

The Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West Irian is unfolding like a Greek tragedy, the conclusion preordained. The main protagonist, the GOI, cannot and will not
permit any resolution other than the continued inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia. Dissident activity is likely to increase but the Indonesian armed forces will be able to contain and, if necessary, suppress it.

Ambassador Frank Galbraith noted on July 9, 1969 that past abuses had stimulated intense anti-Indonesian and pro-independence sentiment at all levels of Irian society, suggesting that "possibly 85 to 90%" of the population "are in sympathy with the Free Papua cause." Moreover, Galbraith observed, recent Indonesian military operations, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians, "had stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the Irianese."

President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta in July 1969 while the "Act of Free Choice" was underway. Improving relations with Indonesia's authoritarian regime was clearly uppermost in the mind of Kissinger, who characterized Suharto as a "moderate military man committed to progress and reform." In Nixon's secret briefing papers (Document 9 and
Document 10) for the visit Kissinger flatly told the President "you should not raise this issue" of West Irian and argued "we should avoid any U.S. identification with that act." The White House generally held to this position throughout the period preceding and following the "Act of Free Choice."

Although they recognized the deep flaws in the Act and in Indonesia's intentions, U.S. officials were not interested in creating any problems for a Suharto regime they saw as nonaligned but pro-Washington. While the U.S. was unwilling to actively intervene on Indonesia's behalf (an action they thought unnecessary and counterproductive) at the UN to insure quick General Assembly
acceptance of Indonesia's formal takeover of West Papua, the U.S. quietly signaled that it was uninterested in a lengthy debate over an issue it viewed as a foregone conclusion and marginal to U.S. interests. In a secret briefing memo for a meeting with Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States Soedjakmoto, a State Department official expressed confidence that international criticism of the "Act of Free Choice" would quickly fade, allowing the Nixon Administration to move forward with its plans for forging closer military and economic ties with the authoritarian regime in Jakarta.

See The National Security Archive Link

A SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF ACHEH

The Daily Times [Lahore]
Sunday, June 20, 2004
By Dr Farish A Noor
"The Betrayl of Acheh"

Aceh has played a crucial role in the development of Indonesian national identity and the Indonesian nation-state. But after sacrificing so much to the idea and ideals of Indonesia, it appears that the struggle of the people of Aceh is far from over.For nearly three decades the people of Aceh, the northernmost province of the Indonesian island of Sumatra, have been paying the price for trying to maintain their sense of identity and history. This week, three key leaders of the Aceh movement - Hasan Tiro, Malik Mahmud and Abdullah Zaini - were arrested by the authorities in  Sweden, the country they had fled to in search of exile and  asylum in the 1980s.

Though the Swedish authorities have cited unspecified 'crimes violating international law' as the reason for these arrests, many Acehnese activists and human rights groups claim that Jakarta is behind the detentions. Worse, with Indonesia under pressure to play according to Washington's rules in the so-called 'war on terror', the label 'terrorist' has now been put on the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as well. Thus far the outcry against the arrests have been muted, and Indonesia claims the detentions are part of its efforts to bring peace and stability to the country. But few observers have cared to enquire about the tortured history of Aceh, or ask the obvious question of why Aceh has been fighting for their rights for so long.

Foreign observers of Indonesian politics tend to forget that 'Indonesia' is an artificial entity. Spanning the geographical space of Europe, it comprises more than 350 recognised ethnic groups and 250 linguistic communities. Among the communities of present-day Indonesia, one community in particular stands out for its contribution to the country's independence struggle against the
Dutch; its transnational linkages to the rest of the world and its cosmopolitan make-up:

Aceh.

Situated at the northernmost tip of the great island of Sumatra, the province of Aceh covers the territory of the once-great Kingdom of Aceh. The Acehnese themselves have often been described by Dutch colonial administrators and Oriental scholars as haughty, proud of their achievements and fiercely independent in their outlook.

Being located at the northwestern most fringe of Indonesia meant that Aceh was the one kingdom that was most exposed to, and consequently influenced by, external cultural influences from the West. Aceh was also a major centre of Islamic learning, politics and culture, blending together Acehnese-Malay, Indian, Arab and Turkish influences into what would later become cosmopolitan
expression of Islamic normativity and culture.

But the people of Aceh remained unique in many respects and were proud of their own sense of identity. The Arab travellers who visited the kingdom were shocked to discover that the Acehnese were a matrilineal people and that in Acehnese society women played a prominent role in politics and social life:the 'kingdom' was once ruled by a succession of female 'Sultans' and Aceh even had a woman as the head of its royal navy - Laksamana Koemalahayati - surely a first in Muslim history!

Aceh's moment of glory came at the turn of the 20th century when the Dutch who had consolidated their rule over the rest of the Dutch East Indies made the fatal mistake of trying to conquer and domesticate Aceh as well. This led to the great 'Aceh war', which dragged on for three decades and practically bled the Dutch colonial forces dry. Aceh's resistance to the Dutch inspired other Indonesians and Southeast Asians to rise up in revolt against the colonial masters. The Dutch colonial government in turn faced their first 'Vietnam', and the conflict was so costly that it nearly bankrupted the colonial economy of the Netherlands. At the outset of World War II, the invading Japanese understood the power and influence of the Acehnese on the rest of the region, and plans were made to smuggle a group of Acehnese freedom fighters back into Aceh via Malaya, with the help of anti-British elements in that British colony. During WWII it was Acehnese resistance that proved crucial in the battle for Sumatra and by extension Southeast Asia. The Acehnese expected their sacrifices to be rewarded by the post-colonial government in due course.

This was not to be: When the leaders of Indonesia Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesia independent in 1945, Aceh was given the honorary status of a special province. But it was also integrated into the Indonesian central state system and the local rulers of Aceh were stripped of any real power. Indonesia's brief flirtation with democracy ended when Sukarno declared
himself supreme leader of Indonesia saying that democracy 'could not work' in the country.

By the late 1950s, Indonesia began its slide into authoritarianism with Sukarno declaring 'guided democracy' to be the new philosophy of the state. In the 1960s and 1970s Indonesia's fortunes rose and fell as the outer regions felt themselves marginalised by the central government. The discovery of crucial oil and gas reserves in Aceh made the region even more important to Indonesia's
national development, but the Acehnese themselves felt cheated as the Indonesian oil conglomerate Pertamina simply took away their resources while spending little on the development of Aceh itself.

These factors led to the rise of an increasingly vocal and assertive Aceh regional movement, and the birth of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) that came under the leadership of men like Hasan Tiro. Citing the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2711-XXV (adopted on October 14, 1970) that recognised the right for self-determination on behalf of colonised peoples, GAM began its struggle for independence in the 1970s. But GAM's struggle incurred a heavy cost on the people of Aceh. Indonesia turned the province into a virtual battle zone with thousands of Indonesian army personnel being sent there to eliminate the so-called 'terrorists'. In the early 1980s the Indonesian Elite Kospassus force scored a coup by kidnapping one of the religious leaders of the Aceh movement and transporting him to Jakarta.

Throughout this period, the cost of the struggle in Aceh has been high in terms of abuses of human rights and the loss of innocent lives. But Indonesia was then under the helm of President Suharto, a key trusted ally to Washington, the Western bloc and western economic interests. When Indonesia forcibly annexed East Timor in 1974 the Americans were muted in their protests, as
they were in 1965 when Suharto came to power following the mass killings of opposition communists in the country.

The rest, as they say, is history. But what a bloody history it is too. Since the mid-1970s the Indonesian army has launched several 'security campaigns' in Aceh, such as Operations Rencong I and II, leading to the killing of more than 10,000 civilians and the destruction of much of the social infrastructure there, including schools and hospitals. It was only in 1998, when the
government of the dictator Suharto was on the verge of collapse, that thetrue extent of the horrific murders and abuses in Aceh came to light, with scores of unidentified mass graves being 'recovered' and exposed by the new independent media of post-Suharto Indonesia.

Many had hoped that these revelations would lead to the final recognition of the legitimate demands of the Acehnese, not least their fundamental demand to receive some compensation for the exploitation of the resources in their territory and for more basic development. But following September 11 and the US discourse on 'terrorism' the cause of Aceh has once more been relegated to the margins. What is worse, the Acehnese movement has now been presented as being terrorist instead, leading to further demonisation of GAM and culminating in the recent arrest of its leaders.

Aceh has played a crucial role in the development of Indonesian national identity and the Indonesian nation-state. But the tide of world politics these days is less sympathetic to local movements struggling for autonomy and self-determination. After sacrificing so much to the idea and ideals of Indonesia, it appears that the struggle of the people of Aceh is far from over. That, in the end, is Indonesia's loss as much as it is Aceh's.

Dr Farish A Noor is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist

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